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If any point in dispute is not covered by the Rules, the decision should be
made in accordance with equity.
– Rule 1-4, USGA, Rules of Golf (2008)1
Players must not agree to exclude the operation of any Rule or to waive
any penalty incurred.
– Rule 1-3, USGA, Rules of Golf (2008)2
INTRODUCTION
The Rules of Golf are clear that equity applies where the Rules do not, and
that no Rule – including the Rule mandating the application of equity − may be
waived by private agreement. If only matters were so clear with respect to
fiduciary duties under Delaware law. Ostensibly, the state of the law seems
straightforward. Those fiduciary duties – which are the creation of equity3 –
∗
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LeJeune Distinguished Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas (Minneapolis) School of
Law. The author thanks Christopher Bruner, David Millon, Lash LaRue, and Michael
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1 Rules and Decisions, U.S. GOLF ASS’N, http://www.usga.org/Rule-Books/Rules-ofGolf/Rule-01/ (last visited Dec. 16, 2010) (“Points Not Covered by Rules”). The Rules of
Golf are promulgated by the United States Golf Association (USGA).
2 Id. (“Agreement to Waive Rules”).
3 See infra Part II.
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owed by directors and officers of corporations cannot be waived,4 while those
owed by partners in partnerships and managers of limited liability companies
(LLCs) seemingly can be contractually waived, in whole or in part, by virtue of
various statutes.5 This outcome may be incongruous, but most knowledgeable
commentators − whether or not they support those statutes on policy grounds −
consider the matter to be well-settled.6
This Article disputes that position. It contends that, to the contrary, there is
substantial doubt as to whether fiduciary duties in unincorporated business
associations formed under Delaware law can, by private agreement, be waived
at all. The argument is not a policy argument, although the author believes that
permitting wholesale waiver of fiduciary duties is objectionable and bad
policy.7 The argument also is not that the various statutes are ambiguous or
have been improperly interpreted, taken facially as they are, by Delaware
courts. The argument made here operates at a far more basic level: it contends
that the Delaware General Assembly is constitutionally prohibited from
preventing the judges of the Delaware Court of Chancery from applying
fiduciary duties as those judges think best – whether or not a private agreement
purports to eliminate such duties. Judges themselves, therefore, should not
refrain from applying traditional fiduciary duties as they have always done8 –
i.e., as a particular context may equitably require.

4

See infra Part I.
Id.
6 See, e.g., Thomas E. Rutledge, Waiving Fiduciary Obligations, J. PASSTHROUGH
ENTITIES, Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 43, 44 (“The Delaware LLC[] limited partnership and general
partnership acts expressly permit the elimination of the fiduciary duties, including the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty.”); Edward P. Welch & Robert Saunders, Freedom and Its
Limits in the Delaware General Corporation Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 859, 864 (2008)
(“Scholars consider the directors’ duty of loyalty to be a mandatory feature of Delaware
corporation law . . . [but] parties forming a Delaware limited liability company or a
Delaware limited partnership are specifically authorized by statute to agree that the
managers or general partners will not owe any fiduciary duty of loyalty to the members or
limited partners.”).
7 For policy critiques of statutes permitting broad modification or waiver of traditional
fiduciary duties, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Bumping Along the Bottom: Abandoned
Principles and Failed Fiduciary Standards in Uniform Partnership and LLC Statutes, 96
KY. L.J. 163, 168 (2007-2008); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative
Entities”: From Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 445, 465 (2009). For an early, well-known scholarly defense
of broad contractual freedom in the noncorporate setting, see Larry E. Ribstein, The Revised
Uniform Partnership Act: Not Ready for Prime Time, 49 BUS. LAW. 45, 52 (1993). Professor
Ribstein specifically favors the empowerment of private actors to wholly opt out of
fiduciary duties. Larry E. Ribstein, Fiduciary Duty Contracts in Unincorporated Firms, 54
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 537, 540 (1997).
8 In the absence of clear contractual language modifying or eliminating fiduciary duties,
Delaware courts impose traditional fiduciary duties on managers and controlling members
5
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The argument, at bottom, is a historical argument as well as a constitutional
one. Delaware’s State Constitution of 1792 vested the Delaware Court of
Chancery with the general equity powers equivalent to those then held by the
High Court of Chancery of Great Britain.9 The High Court of Chancery, then,
like the Delaware Court of Chancery in the Eighteenth Century (and today),
had jurisdiction over fiduciary duty matters, such duties being equitable in
origin.10 As a constitutional grant, the Delaware Chancery Court’s jurisdiction
could not be curtailed by legislative action, directly or indirectly, and that
jurisdiction was not altered by subsequent amendments to the Delaware
Constitution in 1831 and 1897.11 This argument is fully developed in Part III.
Part I will set the argument up and demonstrate its profound juridical and
practical significance by describing how the Delaware General Assembly in
recent years has sought, by statute, to permit private agreements abridging
fiduciary duties in the noncorporate setting. Regrettably, that effort has

of LLCs. See, e.g., Kelly v. Blum, C.A. No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10 nn.69-70
(Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (noting that LLC agreements must include “clear and
unambiguous” provisions in order to alter traditional fiduciary duties). But see Fisk
Ventures, LLC v. Segal, C.A. No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 7,
2008), aff’d., 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009) (suggesting without recitation of authority, per
Chancellor William Chandler, that duties or obligations must be found in the agreement or
contract itself). Elaborating along the lines of Chancellor Chandler’s statement in Fisk
Ventures, Chief Justice Myron Steele has similarly argued – in an article, rather than a
judicial opinion – that the “default” or background rule should be that traditional fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty do not apply in the noncorporate business setting unless expressly
created by contract. Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties
in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221,
223-24 (2009). He further elaborated on that position at a seminar titled Recent
Developments in Delaware Corporate and Alternative Entity Law held on April 29, 2010, in
Wilmington, Delaware, where he stated that only the implied contractual covenant of good
faith and fair dealing – not traditional fiduciary duties – should apply as the default rule in
the absence of a contract provision specifically imposing such duties. See Francis G.X.
Pileggi, Updates on Delaware Corporate Law and Alternative Entity Law, DEL. CORP. AND
COM. LITIG. BLOG (Apr. 29, 2010), http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2010/04/articles/
commentary/updates-on-delaware-corporate-law-and-alternative-entity-law/.
9 DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 728-29 (Del. 1951); see infra Part III. The Delaware
Court of Chancery also exercises jurisdiction over equity matters by statute, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 10, § 341 (1999), but a statute, of course, may be amended by a majority of the
members of the General Assembly. For a description of the two different procedures for
amending or revising the Delaware Constitution, see infra note 70. For a recent symposium
extensively addressing the critical role played by state constitutions in our justice system,
see Symposium, State Constitutions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1515 (2010).
10 Harman v. Masoneilan Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 496-98 (Del. 1982); DuPont, 85 A.2d
728-29; see also McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987).
11 DuPont, 85 A.2d at 729. This Article does not address section 9 of article I of the
Delaware Constitution, which mandates a remedy by the due course of law for any injury,
which might also apply to total waivers. DEL. CONST. art. I, § 9.
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wrongly been interpreted as effectively allowing private contracts to oust the
Court of Chancery of its traditional plenary authority over the subject of
fiduciary duties and to allow the legislative branch to aggrandize that authority.
Part III elaborates on why there is no warrant for that “privatization” of law
outcome, given the origins of equity and its key jurisprudential role in relation
to law as traced in Part II, and in light of authoritative Delaware Supreme
Court precedent to the contrary.
In addition to raising a serious and unresolved separation of powers issue,
the practical consequences of the argument made here are threefold, and, being
far-reaching, it is best to identify them at the outset. First, the argument casts
substantial doubt on the legal efficacy of all those provisions in extant
partnership and LLC agreements that seek to eliminate fiduciary duties. The
stakes in this respect are quite large, given that since 2001 new LLC
formations have outpaced all other business entity formations, including
corporations, in both Delaware and across the nation.12 Second, the argument
challenges the judges of the Court of Chancery to reassert their constitutional
authority − and responsibility − over this field of jurisprudence and restore
time-honored fiduciary duties to the law of unincorporated business
associations in Delaware.13 The judges can exercise their power to articulate
fiduciary duties both where private agreements fail to address that subject at all
and, even where agreements do address the subject of duties ex ante –
including agreements with waivers − the judges ex post should apply
traditional duties in the manner a particular context may equitably require.
This may, in many circumstances, lead to a decision to apply the waiver, while
in other circumstances it may result in a decision to disregard the waiver, in
whole or in part. The key point is that, in every case, that specific
determination must be made judicially; it cannot, by the very constitutional
nature of equity in Delaware, be made a priori and categorically, either by the
General Assembly or private contract or both together. Third, the law of
12

Peter Walsh, Jr. & Dominick T. Gattuso, Delaware LLCs – The Wave of the Future
and Advising Your Clients About What to Expect, 19 BUS. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 11,
11; see Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical Study, 15
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459-60 (2010) (“The limited liability company (LLC) is
now undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in the United States.”). A
useful, but as yet lacking, piece of data is the number of existing Delaware LLCs and
partnerships with waiver of fiduciary duty provisions.
13 In Gotham Partners, L.P. v. Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 167 (Del.
2002), the Delaware Supreme Court in dicta stated that common law fiduciary duties should
be applied in the partnership setting. The Gotham Partners decision cast doubt on whether
agreements in the noncorporate setting could altogether eliminate fiduciary duties, rather
than just restrict them, and the decision therefore led the Delaware General Assembly to
amend the noncorporate statutes expressly to permit outright elimination of fiduciary duties.
See Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 12-14 (describing
legislative response to Gotham Partners).
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noncorporate business associations in Delaware is, accordingly, far more
indeterminate than widely believed and more indeterminate than the law of
other states, thereby more closely resembling Delaware corporate law in this
regard.
There is, as it turns out, much to be learned from the Rules of Golf about the
enduring place of equity in a system of rules. Those Rules, unlike current
Delaware case law, have properly governed matters of equity all along.
I.

THE DELAWARE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES: THE
JUDICIAL EMBRACE

The Delaware General Assembly’s treatment of fiduciary duties in
corporations, on the one hand, and in unincorporated associations, on the other
hand, is a study in contrasts. The General Assembly has never addressed the
fiduciary duties of corporate officers, leaving that subject entirely to the
judiciary, which has likewise largely neglected these duties.14 The General
Assembly, however, has addressed the fiduciary duties of corporate directors,
but not to permit curtailing or negating those duties. Rather, in 1986 the
General Assembly permitted the charters of Delaware corporations to include a
provision reducing or eliminating money damages resulting from a director’s
breach of care.15 The director duty of care itself, however, may not be
eliminated; only the consequences of its breach may be altered.16 Neither the
duty of loyalty, nor the consequences of its breach, may be altered in any
way.17
With respect to noncorporate business associations, however, the legislative
story in Delaware is quite different. In 2004, the General Assembly amended
14 See Lyman Johnson & Dennis Garvis, Are Corporate Officers Advised About
Fiduciary Duties?, 64 BUS. LAW. 1105, 1106-08 (2009); see also Hampshire Grp., Ltd. v.
Kuttner, C.A. No. 3607-VCS, 2010 WL 2739995, at *11 & n.77 (Del. Ch. July 12, 2010)
(“There are important and interesting questions about the extent to which officers and
employees should be more or less exposed to liability for breach of fiduciary duty than
corporate directors.”).
15 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
16 Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001).
17 Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2009 WL 857468, at *4 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23,
2009) (prohibiting provisions seeking to exculpate director loyalty breaches); see Welch &
Saunders, supra note 6, at 859 (articulating the “clear, negative implication” of section
102(b)(7) that exculpations for directors’ duty of loyalty would be invalid and
unenforceable). Although the Delaware corporate statute empowers a corporation to
renounce corporate opportunities, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122(17) (2001), that
provision does not relieve directors of their duty of loyalty. In this regard, even if, as a
theoretical matter, one conceives of corporate relationships as “contractual” in nature,
corporate law recognizes that the character of those relationships will not be decided by the
parties alone, but that societal interests also matter. See Lyman Johnson, Individual and
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2239-40
(1992).
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section 18-1101 of the Delaware Limited Liability Company Act to permit
members to abolish – not simply modify − fiduciary duties themselves and
liabilities flowing from a breach of those duties.18 The pertinent language is:
§ 18-1101. Construction and application of chapter and limited liability
company agreement. . . .
(c) To the extent that, at law or in equity, a member or manager or
other person has duties (including fiduciary duties) to a limited liability
company or to another member or manager or to another person that is
a party to or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company
agreement, the member’s or manager’s or other person’s duties may be
expanded or restricted or eliminated by provisions in the limited
liability company agreement; provided, that the limited liability
company agreement may not eliminate the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. . . .
(e) A limited liability company agreement may provide for the
limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of contract
and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a member, manager
or other person to a limited liability company or to another member or
manager or to another person that is a party to or is otherwise bound by
a limited liability company agreement; provided, that a limited liability
company agreement may not limit or eliminate liability for any act or
omission that constitutes a bad faith violation of the implied
contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.19
Delaware also amended its general partnership statute and its limited
partnership statute to permit total curtailment of customary fiduciary duties and
liability for any breach of those duties.20 All three of these noncorporate
statutes, therefore, permit, but do not mandate, the contractual waiving of
fiduciary duties. As with the limited liability company statute,21 the general
partnership statute and the limited partnership statute both include a provision
expressing a contractarian policy preference: “It is the policy of this chapter to

18 Kelly v. Blum, C.A. No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010)
(“[Delaware’s LLC statute] goes further by allowing broad exculpation of all liabilities for
breach of fiduciary duties − including the duty of loyalty.”). Abolishing fiduciary duties
themselves will leave investors without a remedy for managerial misconduct unless, as is
unlikely, the agreement itself provides contractual protection. Eliminating only liability for
a breach of duty will, by contrast, permit an investor to seek equitable relief, such as an
injunction.
19 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(c), (e) (2005). This Article addresses subsection (c),
not subsection (e). Similar arguments might be pertinent with respect to subsection (e).
20 Id. § 15-103(a), (f) (governing general partnerships); id. § 17-1101(d), (f) (governing
limited partnerships). As with the LLC statute, supra note 19, the partnership statutes do
not permit elimination of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
21 Id. § 18-1101(b).
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give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the
enforceability of partnership agreements.”22
In Delaware courts in recent years, these new statutes consistently have been
interpreted to do what they purport to do on their face: permit the elimination
of fiduciary duties.23 For example, in Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal,24 the Court
of Chancery held that in an LLC operating agreement “flatly stating that
members have no duties other than those expressly articulated in the
Agreement,” the parties had contractually eliminated traditional fiduciary
duties, precisely as contemplated by the limited liability company statute.25
Chancellor Chandler laid the conceptual foundation for that conclusion in the
very first sentence of his opinion, where he stated: “Contractual language
defines the scope, structure, and personality of limited liability companies.”26
He buttressed that view with his later assertion that limited liability companies
“are creatures not of the state, but of contract.”27 In a July 2010 opinion, ViceChancellor Leo Strine likewise strongly urged that private contracting parties –
not courts – control whether fiduciary duties are owed in noncorporate settings:
“When, as the parties here did, they cover a particular subject in an express
manner, their contractual choice governs and cannot be supplanted by the
application of inconsistent fiduciary duty principles that might otherwise apply
as a default.”28 In addition, the Delaware Supreme Court, citing the LLC
enabling statute, has upheld a provision in an operating agreement limiting
manager liability for a breach of fiduciary duty to instances of fraudulent,
illegal, or bad faith conduct.29 Numerous cases are in accord, provided the
language of such agreements is clearly drafted.30 Consequently, private
contracts annulling or weakening fiduciary duties, and contracts negating or
22

Id. §§ 15-103(d), 17-1101(c).
Kelly, 2010 WL 629850, at *11 n.77 (collecting cases which have allowed broad
exculpation for liabilities stemming from breaches of all types of fiduciary duties, including
the duty of loyalty). For a good description of the reluctance in earlier decisional law to
permit outright elimination of fiduciary duties, see Steele, supra note 13.
24 C.A. No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156 (Del. Ch. May 7, 2008), aff’d., 984 A.2d 124
(Del. 2009).
25 Id. at *11.
26 Id. at *1.
27 Id. at *8.
28 Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, C.A. No. 5001-VCS, 2010 WL
2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010).
29 Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 181101(e) (2005)).
30 See, e.g., DirecTV Latin Am., LLC v. Park 610, LLC, 691 F. Supp. 2d 405, 438
(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (applying Delaware law); Kelly v. Blum, C.A. No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL
629850, at *11 n.77 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010) (citing Wood, 953 A.2d at 141 and Abry
Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC., 891 A.2d 1032, 1063 (Del. Ch. 2006)); Bay
Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC, C.A. No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL
1124451, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
23
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reducing liability for breaching such duties, have received uniformly strong
and uncritical judicial endorsement outside the corporate setting.
Courts occasionally and quite briefly do what Chancellor Chandler did in
the Fisk Ventures decision noted above and expressly ground their rulings on
the legislative policy of freedom of contract.31 The Court of Chancery recently
stated, for example: “We should be reluctant to be more restrictive of freedom
of contract than those elected by our citizens to write the statutory law.”32
Another opinion, citing an influential article by Chief Justice Steele strongly
advocating judicial deference to legislative policy,33 stated without elaboration
that “the conceptual underpinnings of the corporation law and Delaware’s
limited partnership law are different,”34 attempting to justify on that frail basis
the elimination of all duties in the partnership setting. Beyond these sparse
assertions, however, Delaware judges, while broadly endorsing fiduciary duty
waivers, have paid scant attention to the policy dimensions of those waivers.
Pretty clearly, the judiciary and the business law bar regard the propriety of
contracting around fiduciary duties in noncorporate contexts to be settled.35 To
be sure, commentators are split on the policy wisdom of these enactments, with
many scholars remaining quite critical.36 Apart from a few dissenting voices,
however, the whole episode of radically upending centuries of law took only a
few short years to accomplish; or so it appears. Those who believe this,
however, forget that equity originates outside law and does not readily yield to
law’s strictures, a subject addressed in Part II. They also may not wholly
appreciate a unique feature of equity in Delaware: that it enjoys constitutional
status, and thus its judge-made doctrines cannot be abridged by statute, a
subject developed in Part III.

31

See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
Abry Partners, 891 A.2d at 1064.
33 Steele, supra note 13, at 5. Chief Justice Steele argued that the policy directive of the
General Assembly “carries the day over even the most clearly defined doctrinal common
law principles.” Id. The Chief Justice firmly believes that legislative policy should control
in this area, as he repeatedly returns to this underpinning for his position: “What the
[statutory] amendment potentially does is takes away from the courts a well-developed
framework of doctrine from the corporate law arena.” Id. at 14 (emphasis added). He later
asserted: “Delaware courts will follow the stated statutory policy of promoting freedom of
contract and recognize that as attractive as it may be, the common law governing corporate
fiduciary relationships must yield to statutory policy.” Id. at 32 (emphasis added). As
argued in Parts II and III, however, courts of equity legally need not, and historically have
not, yielded categorically to legislatures in certain areas, including fiduciary duties.
34 Twin Bridges, LP, v. Draper, C.A. No. 2351-VCP, 2007 WL 2744609, at *19 n.113
(Del. Ch. Sept. 14, 2007).
35 See supra note 6.
36 See supra note 7.
32
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EQUITY’S ORIGINS AND ROLE

Equity in the Western legal tradition has always coexisted somewhat
uneasily with law, threatening as it does to “subvert” and destabilize legal
principles.37 Aristotle cogently described the vital role of equity in a system of
justice. He identified the universality of law as a potentially ironic source of
injustice in particular cases: “[A]ll law is universal, but there are some things
about which it is not possible to speak correctly in universal terms. . . . [T]he
law takes the majority of cases, fully realizing in what respect it misses the
mark.”38 In Aristotle’s view, in certain circumstances equity must correct the
possible injustice resulting from the categorical, but occasionally flawed,
nature of law’s precepts:
[T]he equitable is both just and also better than the just in one sense. It is
not better than the just in general, but better than the mistake due to the
generality [of the law]. And this is the very nature of the equitable, a
rectification of law where law falls short by reason of its universality.39
In the English Chancery Court, this appreciation of equity’s meliorative
flexibility in a system of universal legal rules was deeply rooted. Sounding an
Aristotelian note, Chancellor Ellesmere in 1615 observed: “The Cause why
there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it
is impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every
particular Act, and not fail in some Circumstances.”40 As more modernly
summarized by former Delaware Chancellor William Quillen: “[E]quity is the
recognition that the universal rule cannot always be justly applied to the
special case. Equity is the flexible application of broad moral principles
(maxims) to fact specific situations for the sake of justice.”41 Again, the

37

MARGARET HALLIWELL, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE IN A CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
6 (1997) (“Fundamental misconceptions of equity abound . . . because of a persistent refusal
to acknowledge that equity is, by its very nature, subversive of the law.”).
38 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 141 (Martin Ostwald trans., Bobbs-Merrill
Co., Inc. 1962) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
39 Id. at 142. In the terms used by HALLIWELL, supra note 37, equity occasionally
“subverts” law to correct a potential injustice caused by law’s inherent universality. Id. at 6.
40 The Earl of Oxford’s Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch. 1615); see also Bishop of
Winchester v. Knight, 24 Eng. Rep. 447, 448 (Ch. 1717) (arguing that it would be a
“reproach to equity” to permit a fiduciary to breach trust).
41 William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of
Chancery – 1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L., 819, 821-22 (1993). The United States
Supreme Court recently described the way in which the “exercise of a court’s equity powers
. . . must be made on a case-by-case basis.” Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563
(2010) (quoting Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964)). The Court went on to
observe the “tradition in which courts of equity have sought to ‘relieve hardships which,
from time to time, arise from a hard and fast adherence’ to more absolute legal rules, which,
if strictly applied, threaten the ‘evils of archaic rigidity.’” Id. at 2563 (quoting Hazel-Atlas
Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 248 (1944)). The R&A – the Scotland-
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enduring influence of Aristotle is evident in Quillen’s invocation of equity in
aid of attaining a larger justice to which law itself, occasionally, can be a
hindrance.
Equity’s role in relationship to law is well-established in Delaware corporate
law. In 1971, the Delaware Supreme Court famously stated in Schnell v.
Chris-Craft Industries, Inc.42 that “inequitable action does not become
permissible simply because it is legally possible.”43 To illustrate, the Delaware
Supreme Court has held that an otherwise lawful corporate contract is invalid
if entering it constitutes a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty.44 And prior
approval of a director conflict of interest transaction by disinterested directors
or shareholders under section 144 of the Delaware corporate statute does not
based promulgator of golf rules for all countries except the United States and Mexico – has
jointly issued the Rules of Golf with the USGA since 1952. The R&A Group, THE R&A,
http://www.randa.org/en/RandA/The-RandA-Organisation.aspx (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
In a response to an FAQ, “What does the term Equity mean?,” the R&A answered quite
similarly to Chancellor Quillen: “Occasionally [sic] situations arise that are simply not
covered by the Rules of Golf, thus a decision must be made according to what is fair.”
Rules of Golf, THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Rules-and-Amateur-Status/Rules-ofGolf.aspx#/rules/?ruleNum=1&subRuleNum=4 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
Under
Interpretation 1-4/9, the R&A offered a colorful illustration of Rule 1-4, a rule identical to
USGA Rule 1-4 (see supra note 1 and accompanying text):
Q: A player’s ball comes to rest in a bird’s nest or so close to the nest that he could
not make a stroke without damaging it. In equity (Rule 1-4), does the player have any
options in addition to playing the ball as it lies or, if applicable, proceeding under Rule
26 or 28?
A: Yes. It is unreasonable to expect the player to play from such a situation and
unfair to require the player to incur a penalty stroke under Rule 26 (Water Hazards) or
Rule 28 (Ball Unplayable).
Rules of Golf, THE R&A, http://www.randa.org/en/Rules-and-Amateur-Status/Rules-ofGolf.aspx#/rules/?ruleNum=1&subRuleNum=4 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
The
Interpretation goes on at length to describe the relief the player will be given to be fair. Id.
42 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
43 Id. at 439.
Justice Randy Holland has written that the Schnell principle is so
foundational that “Delaware corporate law may well be seen as an extended commentary on
the concepts of legality and equity. Schnell made it plain that, in Delaware, equity trumps.”
DELAWARE SUPREME COURT: GOLDEN ANNIVERSARY 1951-2001, at 92 (Randy J. Holland &
Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001); see also Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of
Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923) (“That . . . [a] power is found in a statute, supplies no
reason for clothing it with a superior sanctity, or vesting it with the attributes of tyranny. . . .
[I]f it should appear that the power is used in such a way that it violates any of those
fundamental principles which it is the province of equity to assert and protect, its restraining
processes will unhesitatingly issue.”).
44 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 51 (Del. 1994); see
also CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 238 (Del. 2008) (applying
the “the prohibition . . . against contractual arrangements that commit the board of directors
to a course of action that would preclude them from fully discharging their fiduciary duties
to the corporation and its shareholders”).
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altogether remove the transaction from later judicial scrutiny.45 This
supervening role of equity has been repeatedly recognized in Delaware
lawmaking, a point underscored by Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine in a 2005
article:
For all these reasons, the judiciary’s constant appreciation of the separate
roles that law and equity play in the evolution of corporate law making is
vital to the continued development of our system of corporate law. The
self-discipline of separating the inquiry into whether the challenged
conduct is lawful, in the sense of being prohibited by a statute or
governing instrument, from the inquiry into whether the challenged
conduct is equitable in the particular circumstances before the court,
promotes better decision making and makes more credible the judiciary’s
exercise of its common law making powers. No doubt, this separation
makes plainer the reality that judges – particularly Delaware judges who
decide corporate cases – do make law more than occasionally. But it
simultaneously forces judges to admit when they are making a debatable
policy choice and to be mindful of the difference between the judiciary’s
role in making limited case-specific determinations of appropriate
fiduciary behavior and the legislature’s role in establishing broad, acrossthe-board limits on permissible managerial conduct.46
A key creation of judge-made equity is the concept of fiduciary duties. As
noted by former Delaware Chancellor William Allen, fiduciary duties spring
from equity: “Among the most ancient of headings under which Chancery’s
jurisdiction falls is that of fiduciary relationships. . . . Chancery takes
jurisdiction over ‘fiduciary’ relationships because equity, not law, is the source
of the right asserted.”47 Justice Randy Holland likewise recently observed that
“the fiduciary duties of directors of Delaware corporations are an equitable
response to the power that is conferred upon directors as a matter of statutory
law.”48
As to origins in the Anglo-American corporate law tradition, Justice Holland
notes that “those equitable fiduciary duty precepts date back to a decision by
the Lord Chancellor of England in 1742.”49 In that renowned decision,

45

See In re Cox Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., 879 A.2d 604, 614-15 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(emphasizing that section 144 deals solely with problem of per se invalidity, not whether
conflict of interest transactions might give rise to claims for breach of fiduciary duty).
46 Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action is Lawful, Presumably There Are Circumstances
in Which it Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit Corollary to the Rule of Schnell
v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 906 (2005) (emphasis added).
47 McMahon v. New Castle Assocs., 532 A.2d 601, 604 (Del. Ch. 1987); see also
Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9-10 (Del. 1998) (describing fiduciary duties).
48 Randy J. Holland, Delaware Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U.
PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 678 (2009).
49 Id.
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Charitable Corp. v. Sutton,50 the Lord Chancellor addressed the possible
liability of committee-men (directors) for gross negligence in allegedly failing
to supervise company affairs.51 He ruled that such persons had accepted a
position of trust, and as such, owed the obligation “to execute it with fidelity
and reasonable diligence.”52 Later, those duties were explicitly characterized
as “fiduciary” in nature,53 and early Delaware decisions likewise refused to
countenance such breaches of trust,54 the Chancery Court specifically
describing directors as “fiduciaries” by the early Twentieth Century.55 From
this centuries-long foundation – running from Aristotle to the English Court of
Chancery to the Delaware Chancery Court − grew the deeply-embedded duties
of loyalty and care now owed by corporate directors.56
As important as the actual substantive duties delineated in Sutton was the
Lord Chancellor’s supreme certainty of his abiding power to formulate and
apply such duties: “Nor will I ever determine that a court of equity cannot lay
hold of every breach of trust, let the person be guilty of it either in a private, or
public capacity.”57 And perhaps presciently anticipating an effort by law to
curb equity’s power, the Lord Chancellor was emphatic: “I will never
determine that frauds of this kind are out of the reach of courts of law or
equity, for an intolerable grievance would follow from such a determination.”58
A tribunal exercising equity jurisdiction, in the Lord Chancellor’s view, rightly
claimed both the original power to create fiduciary duties and the continuing
judicial power to afford a remedy for their breach.
To sum up, fiduciary duties originate from equity, not law, and they play a
vital tempering role in a rules-based system of justice. Quite simply, “[t]he
hallmark of a fiduciary relationship is that one person has the power to exercise
control over the property of another as if it were her own.”59 Consequently,
numerous relationships are fiduciary in character, including those within trusts,
corporations, partnerships, and LLCs.60 Fiduciary duties are, historically, the

50

2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
Id. at 406, 26 Eng. Rep. at 645.
52 Id.
53 Aberdeen Ry. Co. v. Blaikie Bros., [1854] 1 Macq. 461, 471 (H. L.) (appeal taken
from Scot.).
54 See Holland, supra note 48, at 680.
55 See, e.g., Bodell v. Gen. Gas & Elec. Corp., 132 A. 442, 446 (Del. Ch. 1926), aff’d,
140 A. 264 (Del. 1927).
56 Holland, supra note 48, at 678-82.
57 Sutton, 2 Atk. at 406, 26 Eng. Rep. at 645.
58 Id.
59 Sokol Holdings, Inc. v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, C.A. No. 3874-VCS, 2009 WL
2501542, at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 5, 2009).
60 Id. For a fascinating exploration of the law/equity tension and the related separation of
powers issue in connection with LLC charging orders, see Thomas Earl Geu et al., To Be or
Not To Be Exclusive: Statutory Construction of the Charging Order in the Single Member
51
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product of courts, not legislatures.61 And critically, courts of equity claim the
ongoing authority to deploy equitable constructs to modulate the innate, but
sometimes problematic, universality of legal principles when – in a particular
case – doing so is necessary for the greater attainment of justice.
III. IRREPRESSIBLE EQUITY
A.

The Attempted Legislative Incursion

With the origins and role of equity in business law now understood, the
critical question is whether any of this has changed in noncorporate business
organizations due to the recent enactment of the various statutes noted
earlier.62 The thrust of the three noncorporate waiver statutes is obvious and
straightforward: to legislatively permit, by means of private agreement, the
abridging or curtailing of fiduciary duties.63 Courts, so far, have uncritically
gone along with these unprecedented arrangements.64 As argued below,
however, these statutes and the agreements they endorse do not alter the
traditional jurisdiction or power of the Chancery Court to interject and apply
fiduciary duties in noncorporate businesses. Consequently, if Delaware courts
continue to sanction these historically anomalous statutes and contracts, it is
not because legally they must, but because they choose to. They can, and in
certain instances should, however, choose otherwise.
It is important to emphasize that none of the statutes seeks formally or
directly to oust the Chancery Court of its jurisdiction over equity matters, in
general, or fiduciary duty disputes in particular. Rather, the General Assembly
acted to permit contracting parties themselves to eliminate or modify fiduciary
duties, notwithstanding that those duties originated in equity. Fiduciary duties,
however, do not depend on contract for their existence; they are created and
subsist by virtue of courts wherever a fiduciary relationship exists.65 Their
provenance not being private bargain,66 curtailment by bargain does not legally

LLC, 9 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 83, 112-13 (2011).
61 Delaware, unlike most states, has no statute specifying fiduciary standards of conduct
for directors or officers. Such standards are entirely judge-made in Delaware. See Johnson
& Garvis, supra note 14, at 1106-08. The same is true for general partners in partnerships
and managers in LLCs. See Bay Ctr. Apartments Owner, LLC v. Emery Bay PKI, LLC,
C.A. No. 3658-VCS, 2009 WL 1124451, at *8 n.33 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2009).
62 See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
63 See id.
64 See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text.
65 See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
66 In this regard, the author believes that Chancellor Chandler is wrong in stating, in Fisk
Ventures, LLC v. Segal, C.A. No. 3071-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 7,
2008), aff’d., 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009), that “[i]n the context of limited liability companies,
which are creatures not of the state but of contract, those duties or obligations must be found
in the LLC Agreement or some other contract.” Likewise, this author also believes that
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or sensibly follow.67 The noncorporate statutes permitting fiduciary duty
waivers, therefore, seek indirectly to prevent courts from applying traditional,
judge-made equitable concepts if contracting parties so elect. In effect, the
General Assembly is aggrandizing to itself, and private parties, the power to
decide what the Delaware judiciary can and cannot do in this area. The courts,
as noted in Part I above, appear so far to have acquiesced to this encroachment,
not on well-developed (if debatable) policy grounds, but on a puzzlinglywrong sense of legal necessity.68
In Delaware, the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction over matters sounding
in equity – including fiduciary duty cases − both by statute and constitution.69
Although the General Assembly can amend the jurisdictional statute, it cannot
so readily amend the Delaware Constitution, nor can it revise the
Constitution.70 Thus, an important issue on the waiver question is the current

Chief Justice Steele is wrong in advocating that fiduciary duties should not exist in the
noncorporate setting unless parties themselves expressly create such duties by contract. See
Steele, supra note 8, at 233-34. That position does not represent mere deference to the
General Assembly. It is, rather, a jettisoning of the centuries-old judicial practice of holding
business managers – who exercise power over the property of others, see supra note 59 − to
a baseline fiduciary standard. Even contractarian theorists like Judge Frank Easterbrook and
Professor Daniel Fischel believe a strong set of fiduciary duty rules is necessary to
supplement an investor’s need to monitor a manager. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-03 (1982). Nothing can
stop the Delaware judiciary from overthrowing longstanding practices, of course, but on
stare decisis grounds it should be done reluctantly and, in all events, it should be done
forthrightly as a carefully considered judicial decision to abandon the imposition of duties in
deference to private contract, in Chandler’s case, or, in Steele’s case, to abandon them carte
blanche unless expressly created ex ante by contract.
67 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
68 Recently, for example, Vice-Chancellor Leo Strine expressly stated that, where one
party urged the imposition of fiduciary duties in a manner apparently inconsistent with
contractual language, the court was powerless to do so because “[t]his court cannot play
such a role . . . . [And] [u]nder our law dealing with alternative entities such as LLCs here,
this court may not do that.” Related Westpac LLC v. JER Snowmass LLC, C.A. No. 5001VCS, 2010 WL 2929708, at *8 (Del. Ch. July 23, 2010). That strongly, and wrongly,
suggests judicial inability, not unwillingness, to act. Contrast Vice-Chancellor Strine’s
position with the Lord Chancellor’s view in 1742 that fiduciary misconduct is never “out of
the reach of courts of law or equity.” Supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
69 See supra notes 9-11 and infra Part III.B.
70 There are two different ways to change the Delaware Constitution.
I thank my
colleague Christopher Bruner for bringing this issue to my attention. A commentary on the
Delaware Constitution provides a good description of these methods.
Article XVI [of the Constitution] describes two different procedures for changing the
Delaware Constitution. These procedures include an amendment process by the
General Assembly and a revision process by a constitutional convention. Neither
procedure permits the people to vote directly on proposed changes to the Delaware
Constitution. Neither procedure requires the governor’s approval. . . .
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scope of the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction over fiduciary duty matters under

Article XVI, Section 1 authorizes amendments to the Delaware Constitution to be
proposed in the General Assembly and, if agreed to by two-thirds of all the members of
each house, requires the secretary of state to publish the text of the amendment in the
newspapers three months before the next general election. If the General Assembly
elected at that general election agrees to such proposed amendment by a two-thirds
vote of all the members of each house, the amendment thereupon becomes part of the
constitution.
By Article XVI, Section 2 of the Delaware Constitution, the General Assembly is
authorized to submit to the people the question of whether or not a constitutional
convention should be assembled for the purpose of revising the constitution. In the
event the answer of the people to this question is in the affirmative, the General
Assembly is then authorized to convene a constitutional convention and the method of
convening such a convention is set out in Article XVI, Section 2. There is, however,
no provision for the submission of the product of the constitutional convention to the
people for approval or disapproval.
While there is no provision in Article XVI, Section 2 for the submission of the
product of the work of a constitutional convention to the people, there is, by reason of
Article XVI, Section 1, provision for an indirect submission to the people of a proposed
amendment to the constitution passed by the General Assembly. This results from the
requirement of publication by the secretary of state of any proposed constitutional
amendment three months before the holding of a general election, to be held between
the final adjournment of the originating session of the General Assembly and the
convening of the General Assembly to be elected at the intervening general election.
The theory of this requirement, made clear by the delegates of the constitutional
convention, is that the people, being made aware of a proposed amendment, can then
judge which candidates for election to both houses of the General Assembly are in
favor of the view the individual voter takes toward the proposed amendment. This is
the only means provided in the Delaware Constitution for submission to the people of
any change in the constitution. In this respect, Delaware differs from all of the other
states of the union, which do require approval by the people of proposed changes in
their constitution.
RANDY J. HOLLAND, THE DELAWARE STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 228-29
(2002). One interpretive question that naturally arises is the difference between an
“amendment” of and a “revision” to the Constitution. In an Opinion of the Justices, 264
A.2d 342 (Del. 1970), the individual members of the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted
the relationship between an amendment of the Delaware Constitution under article XVI,
section 1 and a revision under article XVI, section 2. Id. at 346. In construing the meaning
of the terms, the justices concluded that it is the type of change and not the number of
changes that determines whether section 1 or 2 is applicable. Id. at 345. “Amendments” are
modifications that do not make a substantial or fundamental change or alteration. Id. at 346.
Conversely, “revisions” encompass more than a mere restatement, reorganization,
modernization, abbreviation, consolidation, simplification, or clarification of an existing
document. Id. Revisions are substantial, basic, fundamental changes in the government’s
plan that achieve purposes and objectives beyond the lines of the present constitution. Id.
Although the descriptions of these different types of changes serve as a helpful guide, a final
determination is dependent on the facts and circumstances of each proposed change. Id.
Under these guidelines, altering the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court would seem to be
sufficiently substantial or fundamental as to constitute a “revision,” thereby foreclosing
action solely by the General Assembly.
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the Delaware Constitution. Resolving this issue will determine whether
Delaware’s judges must accede to the General Assembly’s effort to foreclose
courts from discharging a long-held, core function, or, alternatively, whether
courts themselves retain full power to apply customary fiduciary duties when
faced, in a particular noncorporate case, with both inequitable conduct and a
contract plainly purporting to waive all duties.
B.

The Chancery Court’s Continuing Constitutional Authority Over
Fiduciary Duties

The foundational case for understanding the Court of Chancery’s continuing
authority over fiduciary duties in noncorporate business settings is not a
business case at all, but one involving a deserted wife’s suit for separate
maintenance.71 After being abandoned by her husband, Dorothy Elizabeth
Barton DuPont sued her husband for maintenance in the Court of Chancery.72
Her husband, Alfred Victor DuPont, moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction,
contending that, by statute, the matter should be heard in Family Court.73 The
Court of Chancery denied the motion to dismiss and appeal was taken to the
Delaware Supreme Court.74
The DuPont case squarely addressed the ability of the General Assembly to
reduce the Court of Chancery’s equity jurisdiction. This decision necessitated
a detailed examination of certain provisions of Delaware’s various
constitutions – those of 1897, 1831, 1792, and 1776.75 The relationship
between sections 10 and 17 of article IV of the Constitution of 1897 (then and
still in effect) presented the most challenging interpretive task. Section 10, in
essence, provides that the Court of Chancery “shall have all the jurisdiction
and powers vested by the laws of this State in the Court of Chancery.”76
Section 17 provides that “The General Assembly, notwithstanding anything
contained in this Article, shall have power to repeal or alter any Act of the
General Assembly giving jurisdiction to . . . the Court of Chancery.”77 The
defendant’s position in DuPont was that section 17 permitted the General
Assembly to divest the Chancery Court of jurisdiction over his wife’s suit for
maintenance and confer exclusive jurisdiction in the Family Court.78
The Supreme Court’s analysis in DuPont combined a close reading of the
text of the Constitution with a tour through Delaware’s constitutional history.
As to the text, the Court first noted that section 10 used the term “vested,”

71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

DuPont v. DuPont, 85 A.2d 724, 726 (Del. 1951).
Id.
Id. at 726-27 (citing 45 Del. Laws 935 (1945)).
Id. at 726.
Id. at 727-30.
DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 10.
Id. § 17.
DuPont, 85 A.2d at 727.
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while section 17 used the term “giving,” in describing the Chancery Court’s
jurisdiction.79 As to history, the Court initially observed that by virtue of the
Colonial Act of 1726-1736, the Colonial General Assembly had statutorily
authorized counties in Delaware to hold Courts of Chancery under the same
system of equity as administered by the High Court of Chancery in Great
Britain.80 This power of the General Assembly over the Courts of Chancery
was not changed in Delaware’s first Constitution of 1776, but importantly, it
was dramatically changed by the Constitution of 1792. 81
Section 14 of the Constitution of 1792, like section 10 of the 1897
Constitution, used the term “vested” in describing the Chancery Court’s
jurisdiction, suggesting a non-disturbable jurisdiction, especially given that in
1792 no analog to section 17 of the 1897 Constitution yet existed.82 Only in
section 12 of the Constitution of 1831 does a provision similar to section 17
appear and, like section 17, it used the word “giving” – not “vested” − in
describing the jurisdiction of the Chancery Court.83
In drawing on text and history to reconcile section 10 and section 17 of the
current (1897) constitution, the DuPont Court concluded that the General
Assembly could repeal the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction under section 17 only
as to the increases in that jurisdiction as the General Assembly had made after
1792.84 Critically, the Court held, the General Assembly was constitutionally
prohibited from restricting the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction to less than it was
in 1792.85 And in 1792, the general equity powers of the Chancery Court were
equivalent to those of the High Court of Chancery of Great Britain in 1776, the
date of the separation of the United States.86 On the facts before it, the DuPont
Court went on to conclude that the Delaware Court of Chancery in 1951 still
had jurisdiction to hear suits for maintenance because the General Assembly −
under its limited, implied authority − had not conferred that aspect of equity
jurisdiction on another tribunal exclusively and had not created in such a
tribunal remedies equivalent to those available in the Chancery Court.87

79

Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 728. In an earlier decision, the Delaware Supreme Court had stated that the
“exact date of the [Colonial] Act has not been definitely determined. It was passed during
the administration of Gov. Patrick Gordon, so its date may be fixed as between 1726 and
1736.” Glanding v. Indus. Trust Co., 45 A.2d 553, 561 (Del. 1945).
81 DuPont, 85 A.2d at 728.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 729.
84 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 730. In dissent, Justice Tunnell aptly described the holding of the majority, “that
the minimum limits of equity jurisdiction were frozen in 1792 and have remained so ever
since.” Id. at 739 (Tunnell, J., dissenting).
87 Id. at 734. See Geu et al., supra note 60, at 115 n.137 for another rare scholarly
80
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The DuPont case “cemented the role of the Court of Chancery as a
permanent constitutional fixture.”88 Delaware courts have cited the case in
various contexts,89 and echoed its holding in cases involving breach of
fiduciary duty claims.90 In Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc.,91 the
Delaware Supreme Court held that breach of fiduciary claims falls within the
Court of Chancery’s inherent or exclusive jurisdiction.92 Fiduciary duty claims
were, as noted earlier,93 cognizable in equity in Great Britain prior to 1776, the
key demarcation date in DuPont. The heralded case of Charitable Corp. v.
Sutton,94 cited by Justice Holland as foundational to fiduciary duties,95 was
decided in England in 1742. Consequently, under the reasoning of DuPont,96
the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction over fiduciary duty claims could not be
divested through legislation enacted by the Delaware General Assembly.97
This foundational teaching seems to have been essentially forgotten – or
overlooked – in the all-important area of noncorporate fiduciary duty waivers.
C.

Ongoing Judicial Discretion

For those partnership and LLC agreements purporting to waive fiduciary
duties under statutory auspices, the upshot of the above analysis is simple but
profound: the Chancery Court continues to have jurisdiction to hear claims that
partners or managers breached their fiduciary duties and, exercising that
jurisdiction, may conclude, in particular circumstances, that a partner or
manager inequitably breached a fiduciary duty. This is not to say by any
means that agreements waiving fiduciary duties should be wholly disregarded
by the Chancery Court, or even generally disregarded. The claim here is both
more basic and more demanding of the judiciary. The judges on the Chancery
Court simply cannot, by blithely referring to such an agreement or the

discussion of DuPont.
88 Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 41, at 849.
89 See, e.g., Arzuaga-Guevara v. Guevara, 794 A.2d 579, 584-85 (Del. 2001); Lipstein v.
Diamond State Tel. Co., No. 7763, 1985 WL 11571, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 7, 1985).
90 Diabiase v. Vendemia, C.A. No. 2002-06-178, 2002 WL 31999357, at *1-2 (Del. C.P.
Sept. 17, 2002) (“It is within the Chancery Court’s jurisdiction and discretion to determine
whether Plaintiff’s civil action alleging a breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty come[s] under
its concurrent jurisdiction . . . .”).
91 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).
92 Id. at 498-99.
93 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94 2 Atk. 400, 26 Eng. Rep. 642 (Ch. 1742).
See supra notes 50-53, 57-58 and
accompanying text.
95 See Holland, supra note 48, at 678-79.
96 See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
97 Arzuaga-Guevara v. Guevara, 794 A.2d 579, 585 (Del. 2001) (“[T]he historical
equitable jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to hear a matter cannot be divested simply
by the legislative enactment of a new statute . . . .”).
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underlying enabling statute, avoid their own continuing responsibility to ask –
in every case – whether, in equity, they should or should not enforce the
contractual waiver. No references to legislative policy or contractual freedom
will permit judges to sidestep this continuing power and responsibility. An
example will illustrate the point.
Assume a manager-managed LLC with an operating agreement that, among
other provisions, places sole and plenary managerial power in a single
manager, and also clearly states that the manager owes no fiduciary duties,
including any duty of loyalty, to the LLC or to any or all of its members.
Assume also that the members are of age but are not especially experienced or
sophisticated investors. Assume also that in the course of carrying out his
managerial duties for the LLC, the manager learns of a remarkable business
opportunity that, under Delaware law, clearly would be regarded as an “LLC
opportunity,”98 but, nonetheless, the manager takes the opportunity for himself.
Alternatively, or in addition, assume that the manager personally transacts
business with the LLC on terms that are extraordinarily advantageous to him as
the counterparty and entirely unfair to the LLC.
Of course, absent the contractual waiver, the manager likely would lose on a
member’s claim that he breached the duty of loyalty.99 What difference should
the waiver make? One thing the waiver does not do is categorically oust the
Chancery Court of its jurisdiction or inherent power to decide that, the law
notwithstanding, certain conduct is inequitable.100 The court, therefore, can
and should ask whether in this case the members can make out a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty. Pertinent to this context-specific inquiry will be the
language of the contractual waiver itself, the degree of moral and commercial
repugnance of the managerial behavior, the experience and sophistication of
the members, and the financial and strategic significance of the challenged
dealings for the overall welfare of the LLC. This analysis will, as always,
require the weighing of several factors and, ultimately, demands the exercise of
judgment, with mindfulness being given not only to the interests of the parties
before the court but also to the ramifications for business dealings more
generally – the overall state of business morality being an important and

98 See, e.g., Broz v. Cellular Info. Sys., 673 A.2d 148, 154-55 (Del. 1996) (reiterating
that “a corporate officer or director may not take a business opportunity for his own” if
certain conditions are met).
99 Perhaps the manager would not even have engaged in the disloyal behavior without
the express waiver, possibly being deterred by an abiding sense of duty, if not the clear legal
understanding of it. The very existence of an explicit waiver, however, may itself induce
abandoning inhibition against unfaithful conduct. See Lyman Johnson, Having the
Fiduciary Duty Talk: Model Advice for Corporate Officers (and Other Senior Agents), 63
BUS. LAW. 147, 156 (2007) (describing how managers who understand they owe fiduciary
duties may refrain from negative conduct).
100 See supra Part III.B.
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legitimate societal concern.101 Critically, this also means that the law of
noncorporate business associations in Delaware is more indeterminate than
many believe102 – and more indeterminate than the law of other states lacking
Delaware’s constitutionalizing of equity. This heightened indeterminacy
means Delaware’s noncorporate law more closely resembles its corporate law
in this regard, perhaps according the same competitive advantage deriving
from its expert judiciary. Alternatively, on the other hand, Delaware’s unique
inability to permit wholesale contractual waivers may competitively
disadvantage it in relation to other states.
The hypothetical case outlined above can easily be differentiated from one
where the manager – rather than being disloyal – was simply, or even
especially, careless. Carelessness is less egregious (though not always less
harmful) than faithlessness, and therefore a waiver of such conduct likely will
be enforced. This case also can be readily distinguished from those situations
where members are disappointed with a manager’s particular business
judgment. In that setting also, the waiver likely will be given far greater,
indeed dispositive, weight. The point is that the laudable statutory and
contractual quest for certainty, a commercial virtue to be sure, does not, and
legally cannot, categorically obviate the exercise of equitable discretion to
achieve fairness, also a decided virtue. The judges of the Chancery Court may
rue this discretion, or seek in various ways to shun it or corral it. What they
cannot do is deny they continue to possess it. Nor can lawyers advising parties
who already have entered – or are considering entering − these contractual
waivers overlook this ongoing discretion to upend unjust dealings.
This means that the debate about fiduciary duty waivers in noncorporate
business entities is not over in Delaware. The venue has simply shifted back to
the Court of Chancery. This is where resolution of the important debate over
waivers of fiduciary duty belongs. The judges must resume the short-circuited
policy discussion of these far-reaching provisions, necessarily of course, in the
context of particular disputes. Those who favor outright elimination of
fiduciary duties must, in an adjudicative setting, be prepared to defend waivers
in every conceivable instance. The policy case, as shown above,103 can no
longer comfortably and simplistically rest on judicial deference to the General
Assembly,104 any more than a court can ever relinquish its judicial duties to the
legislative branch. Nor does the vaunted “freedom of contract” argument for

101 Consideration of the law associated with so-called “private” contracts has always
included the interests of society at large, protestations of contractarian theorists
notwithstanding. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. Illegality, duress, mistake, and
other doctrines, for example, all are grounds for judicially overriding private contracts. See
supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
102 See Mohsen Manesh, Delaware and the Market for LLC Law: A Theory of
Contractibility and Legal Indeterminacy, 52 B.C. L. REV. 189, 221 (2011).
103 See supra Part III.B.
104 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
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waivers in the noncorporate setting105 hold up on closer scrutiny. For one
thing, Chancellor Chandler has observed that LLCs “are creatures not of the
state but of contract,”106 while Chief Justice Steele, in contrast, has conceded
that “limited partnerships and limited liability companies, like corporations, are
creatures of statute.”107 Of course, like many close business arrangements –
including corporations – they are creatures of both statute and contract. The
Delaware Supreme Court, for example, has underscored that “[i]t is settled law
that certificates of incorporation are contracts.”108 Moreover, participants in
closely-held corporations frequently bargain over and enter into shareholder
agreements that spell out the details of their relationship; Delaware law accords
them “freedom of contract” in this regard,109 but they remain bound by
fiduciary duties. In addition, all noncorporate business statutes, like the
Delaware corporate statute, confer state-ordained benefits – limited liability
being the obvious example110 − that participants themselves do not and cannot
create by contract inter se.
A stronger case for waivers would focus on the desirability of greater
certainty and determinacy in intra-firm relations and on allowing passive
investors to exchange the possibility of greater risk from broad waivers for
other perceived benefits. Many investors may completely understand,
reasonably foresee, and yet still be willing to bear, the risks associated with
blanket waivers. They may believe that a manager’s past performance, desire
to protect and enhance his or her reputation, need to access capital markets in
the future, and possibly additional considerations, all coalesce to provide
sufficient safeguards against truly egregious misconduct.
There is, consequently, a respectable policy case to be made for permitting
broad fiduciary duty waivers ex ante. The fallacy, however, is reasoning that
because enabling statutes are necessary to permit waivers in those instances
where they are desirable and knowingly availed of, those statutes must be
construed as likewise sanctioning broad waivers in every conceivable instance.
A proper construction of the waiver statutes would regard them as necessary to
permit a contractual waiver at all, but not sufficient ipso facto to conclusively
establish the propriety of a waiver under all circumstances.111

105

See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Fisk Ventures, LLC v. Segal, C.A. No. 3017-CC, 2008 WL 1961156, at *8 (Del. Ch.
May 7, 2008), aff’d., 984 A.2d 124 (Del. 2009).
107 Steele, supra note 13, at 5.
108 Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114, 120 (Del. 2006).
109 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 350, 354 (2001).
110 See, e.g., id. § 102(b)(6).
Moreover, as distinct legal “persons,” noncorporate
business entities likely enjoy the same constitutional protections enjoyed by corporations
under the recent United States Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 899-900 (2010). These protections are conferred by
law, not private agreement.
111 The waiver statutes might be construed in the way section 144 of the corporate statute
106
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The dilemma is the usual one in designing and interpreting categorical legal
rules. On the one hand, Delaware’s enabling statutes understandably seek to
curb the potential overbreadth of applying fiduciary duty standards ex post
where business participants appropriately chose to forgo them. On the other
hand, the enabling statutes should not become legal vehicles for countenancing
ex post all managerial conduct, whether contemplated or not, and whether
egregious and misappropriating or not. Investors customarily do not bargain
for betrayal; at least not all of them do all of the time.
Proponents of waivers therefore should not overstate the strength of their
position. They must appreciate that just because a strong policy argument can
be made for waivers in some cases – perhaps many – it does not necessarily
follow that the mere presence of a contractual waiver means a conclusively
strong case for enforcing it can be made in every instance on that basis alone.
There are well-recognized shortcomings with much ex ante bargaining. These
include lack of sophistication, high initial trust, difficulties of foreseeing
opportunism, hesitancy to raise concerns about suspicions, and understandable
concerns about creating hard feelings at the outset of a rosy business
relationship.112 One might pooh-pooh these as hurdles that people simply must
surmount, but human dynamics are such that it is often far easier said than
done. Moreover, even in carefully-crafted contracts there is reason to believe
that the efficacy of contract features supposedly designed for investor
protection may be overstated and that, accordingly, investors (and courts)
should continue to worry about abuse of managerial discretion.113
Also, it is not clear conceptually that members or partners can waive duties
running in favor of an LLC or partnership entity itself, as opposed to those
owed directly to members or partners themselves. Given that LLCs and
partnerships are legally distinct from their investors, and given that fiduciary
duties also are owed to the entities themselves,114 it would seem that only an
authorized representative of the LLC or partnership – not investors alone −
could waive these duties.115 Moreover, it is not clear that the language of the
has been construed – i.e., as dealing solely with the problem of per se invalidity. See supra
note 45. Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court has recently noted in a case not
grounded in constitutionally-based equity: “[W]e will not construe a statute to displace
courts’ traditional equitable authority absent the clearest command.” Holland v. Florida,
130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560 (2010) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
112 Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & The Limited Liability Company: Learning
(Or Not) From Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883, 911-16 (2005).
113 Lee Harris, A Critical Theory of Private Equity, 35 DEL J. CORP. L. 259, 264 (2010).
114 In the corporate setting, of course, fiduciary duties are owed to both the corporation
and its stockholders. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984); Guth v. Loft, Inc.,
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). The wording of the noncorporate waiver statutes – see supra
notes 19-20 and accompanying text – likewise suggests that, absent a waiver, duties run in
favor of the company or partnership itself, as well as in favor of members and partners,
respectively.
115 For a recent example of judicial insistence on clarity as to whether an LLC itself was

2011]

DELAWARE’S NON-WAIVABLE DUTIES

723

waiver statutes covers breaches of fiduciary duty by a promoter in connection
with formation of an LLC or partnership.116 In addition, upon insolvency,
creditors become the beneficiaries of duties owed to the company.117 With a
blanket waiver in place, however, partners and managers of insolvent
businesses would supposedly be free of fiduciary duty constraints, even though
creditors had not consented,118 or, as in the case with corporations,119 even had
notice that duties had been waived. Finally, given a bankruptcy trustee’s
power to reject contracts120 and a duty to creditors to maximize the value of the
estate,121 the trustee might still have the power to bring breach of duty claims
against managers of bankrupt LLCs and partnerships.122
Waiver proponents who concede the possibility of abuse in the deployment
of waivers might, nonetheless, argue that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing affords ample protection. That doctrine, however, as Chief
Justice Steele concedes, is largely a commercial, insurance, and employment
law doctrine, not a business associations doctrine.123 Why try to clumsily
retool an untried concept when one designed specifically for the task at hand –
fiduciary duty – already exists? Moreover, recent decisional law demonstrates
that there is little robustness to the doctrine and that it affords scant
protection.124 Furthermore, the institutional and legal reality is that the

acting, see Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. West Coast Opportunity Fund, LLC, C.A.
No. 4380-VCN, 2009 WL 2356881, at *3 (Del. Ch. July 30, 2009) (holding that an LLC is
not bound by an agreement not signed by person acting in a representative capacity).
116 See, e.g., Roni LLC v. Arfa, 903 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355 (App. Div. 2010) (indicating that
while “[t]he parties’ business or personal relationship is not sufficient to establish a
fiduciary relationship” alone, the specific facts presented are sufficient to conclude that the
promoter owed a fiduciary duty).
117 N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101
(Del. 2007). But see CML V, LLC v. Bax, 6 A.3d 238, 254 (Del. Ch. 2010) (holding that a
creditor has no standing to bring derivative litigation on behalf of insolvent LLC).
118 Of course, this can happen with an insolvent corporation as well, but only as to the
duty of care. See supra notes 15-17. But see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
119 With respect to corporations, the exculpation of directors for duty of care breaches
must be set forth in the certificate of incorporation, a public filing. See supra note 15.
Corporate officers may not be exculpated at all. See Johnson & Garvis, supra note 14, at
1106-08 (recognizing the ambiguity surrounding corporate officers’ fiduciary duties,
compared to the established duties of corporate directors).
120 See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006).
121 Meer v. Aharoni, C.A. No. 5141-CC, 2010 WL 2573767, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 28,
2010).
122 Id.
123 Chief Justice Steele acknowledges that in the business associations context “there is
no current Delaware case law.” Steele, supra note 13, at 16.
124 See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Del. 2010) (holding that the duty of
good faith is a limited and extraordinary remedy and that a court “will only imply contract
terms where the party asserting the implied covenant proves that the other party has acted
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manager of an LLC or general partner in a partnership is in a fiduciary
relationship, as Delaware law conceives that relationship.125 Contractual
waivers may, under the auspices of enabling statutes, seek to eliminate
fiduciary duties, but those provisions do not alter the inherent fiduciary
character of the relationship itself. When a relationship of control and
vulnerability is abused, the Court of Chancery must decide whether to permit
such abuse on the rationale that, ostensibly, a general and open-ended a priori
consent was given. For a time period measurable in hundreds of years, equity
courts have not done so.126 Instead, using the grammar of fiduciary duties,
they occasionally halt or sanction misbehavior ex post and thereby also
affirmatively shape conduct along healthier lines ex ante. There is no reason
today to believe that judge-made business associations law, coupled with and
supplementing contract law, is inferior to law resulting from contracts alone.
In any event, Delaware’s judges must settle this issue by weighing the various
considerations on a case-by-case basis. This too, for hundreds of years, has
been the province of equity judges. Recent legislation in the noncorporate
setting did not, and constitutionally could not, change that responsibility.
CONCLUSION
“bi-vocal.”127

Corporate law is
On the one hand, the legislatively-enacted
corporate statute is “permissive, enabling, and expansive in its thrust,” while,
on the other hand, judicially-imposed duties serve as a counterforce that
constrains and tempers managerial misbehavior that goes too far.128 Each
voice vitally depends on the other to co-produce a desirable balance in
corporate law. In the noncorporate area, Delaware law now risks becoming
“uni-vocal,” with the inhibiting counter-voice of the judiciary being silenced in
favor of the boundless freewheeling unleashed by the waiver statutes.
This Article has argued, however, that the Delaware judiciary has not been,
and cannot be, legislatively silenced in the noncorporate area. The Delaware
Constitution forbids it. Rather, the judiciary has uncharacteristically stilled its
own voice and has stepped away from its longstanding constitutional
responsibility to ensure that all fiduciaries use their powers faithfully. A
contractual waiver of fiduciary duties in LLCs and partnerships is not a blank
check to behave unjustly or in ways that are fundamentally unfair. Courts
here, as elsewhere, must be venues where commutative justice can still be
arbitrarily or unreasonably, thereby frustrating the fruits of the bargain”).
125 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
126 See supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text. As Michael J. Maimone has noted, the
“decision in Schnell emphasized the legal principle that corporate fiduciaries may not
exercise legal rights if their conduct is inequitable either in its purpose or effect.”
DELAWARE SUPREME COURT, supra note 43, at 58.
127 Lyman Johnson, Counter-Narrative in Corporate Law: Saints and Sinners, Apostles
and Epistles, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 847, 849 (2009).
128 Id.
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sought,129 and to fulfill their justificatory role, judges must state, in every case,
why they are deciding as they do. Perhaps a right understanding of the
Delaware judiciary’s continuing power in this area will lead its judges, once
again, to resume their historic role.

129

Lichens Co. v. Standard Commercial Tobacco Co., 40 A.2d 447, 452 (Del. Ch. 1944)
(holding that the function of a court of equity “is to give such relief as justice and good
conscience may require”).

